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Corporate “Miranda” 
Warnings
BY PeteR A. JOY AND KeViN c. McMUNiGAL
Corporate wrongdoing has received great attention during the last decade. Once again it is at the center of national news 
as President Obama and congressional leaders 
debate the need for greater regulation of corpora-
tions. Internal investigations of corporations and 
other organizations have accordingly been on the 
rise, and both corporate and outside counsel play 
important roles in such investigations. Administra-
tive agencies and prosecutors have adopted formal 
and informal measures to push corporations to es-
tablish compliance programs, to disclose wrongdo-
ing voluntarily, and to cooperate with government 
investigations, creating what some commentators 
refer to as a culture of cooperation. This culture 
creates complex and often ambiguous roles and 
duties for corporate counsel.
Key to internal investigations are employee in-
terviews by counsel. One court has called such in-
terviews “a potential legal and ethical mine field.” 
(In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 415 F.3d 333, 240 
(4th Cir. 2005).) Employees, especially senior em-
ployees, may assume that the lawyers represent-
ing their organizational employers represent them 
as well in matters relating to their work. To avoid 
this misunderstanding, both in-house and outside 
counsel now use “corporate Miranda warnings” or 
“Upjohn warnings.” Clear warnings advise the in-
terviewee that counsel represents the organization 
and does not represent the interviewee; commu-
nications between the lawyer and the interviewee 
are protected by the organization’s attorney-client 
privilege and confidentiality rights; the privilege 
and confidentiality rights belong to the organiza-
tion; and the organization, not the interviewee, 
decides whether to consent to disclosure or to 
waive the privilege, thereby controlling govern-
ment access to information from the interview.
In law enforcement interrogation, the Miranda 
warning is an antidote to the coercive effect of 
a custodial setting. In a corporate internal inves-
tigation, the corporate Miranda warning is an 
antidote to employee misunderstanding of the 
lawyer’s role and whom the lawyer represents. In 
both contexts, the warnings are safeguards for the 
person being questioned against potential over-
reaching by the questioner.
There are competing perspectives on warnings 
in internal investigations. Without a warning, the 
employee is likely to be more cooperative and 
help counsel uncover and remedy wrongdoing 
that could otherwise injure both the organization 
and the public. The lawyer’s effective representa-
tion of the organizational client is furthered when 
the employee freely shares information. On the 
other hand, a clear warning helps to guarantee 
that the employee is not misled and advances the 
legal profession’s interests in preventing the law-
yer from being unfair to an unrepresented person. 
A clear warning also helps prevent an employee 
from later arguing that the lawyer established an 
attorney-client relationship with the employee 
that could trigger disqualification in any legal 
matter in which the employee’s interests conflict 
with the organization’s interests.
But why do corporations and their lawyers 
cooperate with the government in the first place? 
What ethical rules bear on conducting an internal 
investigation?  In this column, we explore these 
and other issues concerning the use of corporate 
Miranda warnings.
Why cooperate with the Government?
The current culture of corporate cooperation 
is a product of voluntary disclosure programs, 
prosecutorial charging guidelines, and sentencing 
guidelines, all of which reward cooperation with 
either immunity from prosecution or reduced 
sanctions. State and federal agencies have imple-
mented a number of voluntary disclosure pro-
grams and have established formal cooperation 
guidelines that benefit corporations and other or-
ganizations that self-police and report wrongdo-
ing. Voluntary disclosure programs offering leni-
ency exist in a number of areas, such as antitrust, 
defense procurement, and health care, as well as 
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environmental and tax law. For example, the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division’s 
Leniency Program promises no prosecution for 
a company that is not the subject of an ongoing 
investigation if  the corporation is the first to self-
report illegal antitrust activity completely and 
honestly, has terminated the activity upon its dis-
covery, and cooperates fully with the government. 
In some other areas, the government may stop 
short of promising not to prosecute and instead 
offer to consider the cooperation in determining 
whether to prosecute. (See Lee Stein & Steven J. 
Monde, Culture of Cooperation: Weighing Ben-
efits and Risks, Nat’l l.J., Mar. 8, 2010, at 16.)
In addition to voluntary disclosure programs, 
DOJ charging guidelines advise prosecutors to 
consider, among other factors, whether a corpo-
ration has made a voluntary and timely disclosure 
of wrongdoing, is willing to cooperate in the in-
vestigation, has in place an effective compliance 
program, and has taken action to remediate the 
wrongdoing. Federal Sentencing Guidelines also 
encourage self-reporting by reducing fines for 
timely and complete disclosure, cooperating with 
the investigation, and accepting responsibility.
These programs and guidelines together create 
and reinforce powerful incentives to cooperate to 
reduce liability for wrongdoing. These incentives 
also push organizations to implement ongoing 
compliance programs and to engage in periodic 
investigations that may put an employer’s inter-
ests at odds with an employee who may have en-
gaged in wrongdoing. When a conflict between 
the employer’s interests and the interests of an 
employee occurs, the lawyers involved in the in-
ternal investigation have to be careful to demon-
strate that they have clearly identified their client 
and their role.
Without a warning, an employee interviewed 
during an investigation may not understand the 
lawyer’s role. Such an employee may assume that 
the lawyer for the employer also represents the 
employee and will protect the employee’s inter-
ests. Several ethics rules address this concern.
ethical Obligations
A number of ethics rules provide guidance to 
a lawyer conducting an internal investigation. 
When the interests of the organization are not 
adverse to those of the employee, joint represen-
tation is permitted under Model Rules 1.7 and 
1.13(g) provided an appropriate representative for 
the organization consents to the dual representa-
tion. The employee to be represented, however, 
may not consent for the organization. While joint 
representation may be attractive in some situa-
tions, often it will be difficult to ascertain at the 
start of an internal investigation if  the interests 
of the organization and the client will eventually 
conflict. For that reason, lawyers should be reluc-
tant to recommend joint representation before 
conducting initial interviews.
Because the interests of the organization may 
diverge from those of the organization’s employ-
ees, the lawyer representing an organization must 
be clear about whom the lawyer represents. It will 
typically be clear that the lawyer represents the 
organization. Where ambiguity is likely to occur 
is whether the lawyer represents only the corpora-
tion. In other words, whether the lawyer jointly 
represents the corporation and the employee may 
often be ambiguous both in the lawyer’s mind and 
in the eye of the employee. In dealing with em-
ployees, Model Rule 1.13(f) states that a lawyer 
for an organization must “explain the identity of 
the client when the lawyer knows or reasonably 
should know that the organization’s interests are 
adverse to those of the constituents with whom 
the lawyer is dealing.” While a lawyer conducting 
an internal investigation may not be certain that 
the employee’s interests are in conflict with those 
of the organization, the lawyer will often be aware 
that such a conflict may arise. This is especially 
true if  the internal investigation is prompted by 
a suspicion that one or more employees have en-
gaged in wrongdoing. 
In addition, counsel must be careful to deter-
mine if  the employee is represented by another 
lawyer in the matter. An employee learning of an 
internal investigation may retain a lawyer before 
a scheduled interview. Model Rule 4.2, the anti-
contact rule, prohibits a lawyer from communi-
cating with a person the lawyer knows to be rep-
resented by another lawyer in the matter. If  the 
lawyer knows the employee is represented, then 
the lawyer conducting the internal investigation 
must have the consent of the employee’s lawyer 
before conducting an interview. If  during the in-
terview the investigating lawyer learns that the 
employee has counsel, the investigating lawyer 
should terminate the interview until and unless 
consent is obtained from the employee’s lawyer.
If the employee is not represented by counsel at 
the time of the interview, the investigating lawyer 
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representing the organization must comply with 
ethics rules for dealing with an unrepresented per-
son. Model Rule 4.3 requires that when “the un-
represented person misunderstands the lawyer’s 
role in the matter,” the lawyer must “correct the 
misunderstanding.” Model Rule 4.3 also prohibits 
the lawyer from giving any legal advice except the 
advice to secure counsel “if the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know that the interests of such 
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being 
in conflict with the interests of the client.”
the content of corporate Miranda 
Warnings 
Unless joint representation is contemplated be-
cause the lawyer has determined that the inter-
ests of the corporation and the employee are not 
likely to be adverse, a lawyer conducting an inves-
tigation should usually give an employee a corpo-
rate Miranda warning. What should the warning 
include? The ethics rules are ambiguous on the 
content of such a warning, as are cases dealing 
with warnings.
Consider, for example, the warnings given in 
In re Grand Jury Subpoena. The warnings clearly 
indicated that the lawyers represented the cor-
poration. But they were somewhat ambiguous 
about whether the lawyers also represented the 
employees. The warnings also explained that the 
attorney-client privilege belonged to the corpora-
tion, that the corporation could decide to waive 
the privilege, and that the employee had no say 
over possible waiver.
The trial court found these warnings suffi-
cient to defeat a claim that an attorney-client 
relationship was formed between the investigat-
ing lawyers and the employees. (415 F.3d at 338.) 
The trial court also found that the investigating 
lawyers’ statements that “we can represent you as 
long as no conflict appears,” read in context with 
the rest of the warning, id. at 340 (emphasis in the 
original), was not “sufficient to establish the rea-
sonable understanding that they were represent-
ing” the employees. (Id. (emphasis in original).) 
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, but stated that its 
“opinion should not be read as an implicit accep-
tance of the watered-down ‘Upjohn warnings’ the 
investigating attorneys” used. (Id.)
As the Fourth Circuit’s opinion indicates, an 
investigating lawyer’s statements that he or she 
can or could, under certain circumstances, jointly 
represent the employee tread close to the line of 
leading an employee to believe that the employee 
is being jointly represented. The opinion suggests 
that a lawyer should steer clear of suggesting the 
possibility of joint representation when giving a 
corporate Miranda warning.
How else might the “watered-down” warnings 
found in the In re Grand Jury Subpoena case have 
been made more robust? In addition to the inves-
tigating lawyer clearly stating that the lawyer does 
not represent the employee, there are two addi-
tional matters the inclusion of which would have 
strengthened the warnings. The first would have 
been to explain that in addition to privilege, con-
fidentiality rights are held and controlled by the 
corporation alone and not the employee. Second, 
the warning could have included an explanation 
that should the corporation decide to cooperate 
with the government the corporation could dis-
close the contents of the interview as part of its 
cooperation. 
Some may believe that any warning, much like 
a Miranda warning in a criminal case, may make 
the employee feel like a suspect and withhold in-
formation during the interview. But it should be 
kept in mind that employees have an incentive to 
cooperate with an investigation because failure to 
cooperate could cost them their jobs. In addition, 
employees might also be able to gain immunity 
or reduced sanctions if  they disclose their past 
wrongdoing and cooperate with the investigation 
and the government.
consequences for Violating ethical and 
Legal Obligations
If  the organization’s lawyer is found to have rep-
resented the employee as a result of the lawyer’s 
statements or ambiguity created by the lawyer 
during an internal investigation, significant nega-
tive consequences may follow. First, and most 
likely, the employee could seek to disqualify coun-
sel from representing the organization should the 
organization and employee take conflicting posi-
tions in the matter. If  the lawyer is disqualified, 
the conflict would be imputed to all other lawyers 
in the firm.
If a court decides the lawyer jointly repre-
sented the employee and the organization, then 
the employee and the organization would jointly 
hold confidentiality rights and the attorney-client 
privilege. Instead of the organization exercising 
exclusive control over consenting to disclosure 
and waiving privilege to cooperate with the gov-
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ernment, the employee could refuse to consent 
to disclosure and refuse to waive work-product 
protection and attorney-client privilege relating 
to information counsel collected, thereby ham-
pering the organization’s ability to cooperate with 
the government.
The employee could also file an ethics com-
plaint against the lawyer alleging breach of the 
duties of loyalty and confidentiality as well as 
conflict of interest. Allegations may also include 
violations of other ethics rules discussed previ-
ously, depending on the circumstances of the 
investigatory interview. If  disciplinary authori-
ties find that the complaint has merit, the lawyer 
could face professional discipline. In addition to 
the possibilities of disqualification and profes-
sional discipline, a lawyer who states or implies 
that the employee as well as the organization is 
the lawyer’s client may face malpractice liability. 
Liability could be found if  the lawyer harms the 
employee by breaching the duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality by turning over the contents of the 
interview to the government. If  the lawyer is out-
side counsel, there is also the possibility that the 
organization may initiate a malpractice action.
If  there isn’t a record of what the lawyer stated 
to the employee during the interview, it may be 
hard for the lawyer to prove that an attorney-cli-
ent relationship did not exist. While some courts 
are skeptical of such claims, especially when dis-
qualification is sought, failing to give a warning 
to an employee before conducting an internal in-
vestigatory interview carries potential risks.
conclusion
Counsel conducting an internal investigation for 
a corporate client faces a difficult task of balanc-
ing the need to obtain cooperation from employ-
ees and maximize access to information against 
the danger of misleading employees about coun-
sel’s role. To avoid misunderstanding and possible 
disqualification, a lawyer should give a warning 
to each employee at the start of the interview and 
memorialize the warning. While such warnings 
may cause some employees to withhold informa-
tion, they ensure that employees understand that 
the lawyer does not represent them and that the 
organizational client controls the disclosure of 
information. n
